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19. RESTITUTION 
YEO TIONG MIN 
LLB (National University of Singapore), BCL, DPhil (Oxford), 
Advocate and Solicitor (Singapore) 
Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, National University of Singapore 
Introduction 
19.1 In contrast to 2002, which was an exceptionally bountiful year for the 
law of restitution in Singapore, 2003 has seen far fewer cases in this subject 
area. One important case, Parkway Properties Pte Ltd v United Artists 
Singapore Theatres Pte Ltd [2003] 2 SLR 103, was decided in early 2003 and 
has been noted in (2002) 3 SAL Ann Rev at paras 19.67 to 19.79 in view of its 
significance in relation to other cases noted for the year 2002, including the 
judgment from which the appeal was heard ([2003] 1 SLR 791). Apart from 
this case, the law reports and LawNet database reveal only three Supreme 
Court decisions decided in 2003 which contained any notable discussion on 
the law of restitution. One dealt with statutory contribution, and in two 
others, restitutionary claims, which were pleaded in the alternative to 
contractual claims, failed. The latter two cases provide interesting studies on 
the relationship between the law of contract and the law of restitution. 
Quantum meruit  
19.2 A restitutionary claim was rejected in Grossner Jens v Raffles Holdings 
Ltd [2004] 1 SLR 202. The plaintiff, G, had offered to broker a deal for the sale 
of Swissotel Holding AG (“Swissotel”) to the defendants, R. G’s proposal for 
one per cent of the transaction price as broker’s commission, due upon the 
acquisition of Swissotel by R, was not accepted by R. Pursuant to R’s request 
for more information on the scope of brokerage services to be provided and 
the indicative price for Swissotel, G sent R some publicly available 
information on Swissotel and its subsidiary. G also arranged one meeting 
between representatives of R and those of the owners of Swissotel. 
Subsequently, Swissotel was put up for sale by its owners under competitive 
tender, and R managed to acquire Swissotel in that way. G then demanded his 
commission from R. R disputed G’s entitlement, and offered instead an ex 
gratia “introduction fee”. G refused to accept it, and instituted legal 
proceedings. 
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Contractual and restitutionary quantum meruit 
19.3 It appeared from the judgment that G’s arguments were two-fold. 
First, G had argued that he was entitled to a one per cent commission as a 
matter of contract. Secondly, and in the alternative, G had argued that he was 
entitled to claim a reasonable sum for services rendered (quantum meruit) in 
restitution. Both claims were dismissed by Tan Lee Meng J. The judge found 
that, on the facts, no brokerage contract had been formed, and that, in any 
event, even if there had been a binding contract, the commission was only 
payable if G had succeeded in brokering a private sale of Swissotel to R, but 
the sale was in fact concluded through the competitive bidding process. There 
was a dispute as to what had transpired at the initial meeting arranged by G, 
but the court found as a fact that there was no discussion of the sale of 
Swissotel. 
19.4 What is of greater interest for the purpose of this chapter of the 
annual review is the judge’s dismissal of the claim for quantum meruit. Taking 
the cue from the Court of Appeal in Lee Siong Kee v Beng Tiong Trading, 
Import and Export (1988) Pte Ltd [2000] 4 SLR 559, the judge approached the 
claim on two hypotheses: first, that it was contractual, and second,, that it was 
restitutionary. The earlier Court of Appeal decision had identified that a claim 
for quantum meruit can be based on two legal theories. Firstly, there may be a 
contractual agreement to provide services for remuneration which failed to 
provide for details of the rate of payment or even for the work to be done. In 
such a case, the analysis follows contractual doctrines. Secondly, a quantum 
meruit claim may not be founded on a contract, but may be based on 
restitutionary principles. 
19.5 On the contractual quantum meruit claim, Tan J held that even if 
there had been a contract, the terms provided that the commission was due 
only if G had succeeded in brokering the sale of Swissotel to R, and this had 
not been proven to be the case. The court will not imply a promise to pay 
reasonable remuneration otherwise, in the face of express terms in the 
contract.  
19.6 Tan J then dismissed the restitutionary quantum meruit claim, made 
on the basis that there was no contractual basis for the claim, for two reasons. 
Firstly, the services rendered were not of a kind that merited remuneration. 
The judge found that the information G had sent to R was in the public 
domain, that the sale was not discussed at the meeting which G had arranged 
between the parties, and that G could not respond to R’s query of an 
indicative sale price. Secondly, and more importantly, the judge held that G’s 
claim for reasonable expenses ran counter to the clear understanding that the 
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parties had from the beginning that any remuneration for brokerage services 
was on the basis of success in procuring the sale. 
Benefit 
19.7 On the findings of fact, this was a fairly obvious case where there was 
no benefit to the defendant, so it was unsurprising that there was no 
discussion of the test of benefit used. There has been much academic debate 
on, but little judicial attention paid to, the question of what constitutes 
benefit, especially in regard to services, in the law of restitution. A recent 
interesting judicial discussion of this question is found in McDonald v Coys of 
Kensington [2004] EWCA Civ 47 at [26]–[40]. On the facts of the case before 
Tan J, the services rendered could not be shown to have any realised or 
realisable economic value (thus, no “incontrovertible benefit”). Further, there 
had been nothing on the findings of facts to indicate either that R had sought 
out or requested the services of G or had “freely accepted” the benefit, ie, the 
acceptance of services knowing that the services were not provided for free, 
and having the option to accept or reject the services. An interesting contrast 
may be provided by the Australian case of Andrew Shelton & Co Pty Ltd v 
Alpha Healthcare Ltd (2002) 5 VR 577, where a financial consultant, who had 
approached the defendants to offer to manage a merger between two 
companies, succeeded in a claim for restitutionary quantum meruit after 
providing some services in circumstances where no contract for fees had 
actually been formed. There, the consultant had done much more work, and 
much of it at the request of the defendants. Consequently, Warren J of the 
Supreme Court of Victoria found that the defendants had freely accepted the 
benefits conferred by the consultant. 
Risk assumption 
19.8 The second and more significant reason for rejecting the 
restitutionary claim for quantum meruit was that it was inconsistent with the 
understanding of the parties of the nature of the proposed brokerage 
arrangement. The basis of the claim for restitutionary quantum meruit in 
respect of services rendered in anticipation of a contract that failed to 
materialise is the subject of much academic debate. It has been variously 
argued to be based on failure of consideration, free acceptance (as in the 
Andrew Shelton case, supra), estoppel, or some idea of good faith in 
bargaining. Free acceptance as a ground of restitution remains hotly debated 
among academics but there is some judicial support in English, and especially 
in Australian, authorities. Whatever may be the basis, the reasoning of the 
court in the present case appears to be unassailable. If parties to pre-
contractual negotiations had clearly understood that the risk of wasted 
expenditure was to be borne by the plaintiff, then it is just that the law of 
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restitution should not disturb that allocation of risk. The risk allocation is 
non-contractual, no doubt, but respect for risk allocation by the parties is 
latent within the law of restitution. The importance of risk assumption in the 
law of restitution received ventilation in Info-communications Development 
Authority of Singapore v Singapore Telecommunications Ltd (No 2) [2002] 
3 SLR 488 (noted in (2002) 3 SAL Ann Rev at paras 19.61–19.63). On the 
facts, it could be said that any claims based on failure of consideration, 
estoppel or free acceptance, could not succeed when the risk of the failure of 
the consideration was clearly understood by both parties to be borne by the 
plaintiff. The English authorities (a recent summary of which can be found in 
Countrywide Communications Ltd v ICL Pathway Ltd [2000] CLC 324) 
indicate that whatever may be the basis of the claim, if it is clear that the risk is 
assumed by the plaintiff, the restitutionary claim cannot succeed. 
Failure of consideration 
19.9 In Ngee Ann Development Pte Ltd v Nova Leisure Pte Ltd [2003] 
SGHC 168, the plaintiffs had leased a number of units in Ngee Ann City 
Building to the defendants. The relevant lease was executed on 2 September 
1999, and was for a period of five years. A term in the lease provided that the 
defendants were entitled to a total of six rent-free months, two for each year 
for the first three years. The lease also provided for termination before the end 
of the five-year period, by either party giving six months’ notice. However, if 
the tenants were to give notice of termination, they had to pay the landlords 
half of the rent otherwise payable during the rent-free periods prior to the 
giving of the notice. After some negotiations, the parties signed a “surrender 
agreement” on 28 February 2002, under which agreement the tenants 
surrendered the lease with effect from that date. This agreement provided that 
the surrender was without prejudice to their obligations and undertakings 
under the provisions of the lease prior to that date and which remained 
unperformed.  
19.10 The plaintiffs sued the defendants for the six months’ rent (nearly 
$1.5m) otherwise payable under the rent-free period in the lease, on the basis 
that the rent-free occupation had been given to the defendants on the 
condition that the defendants did not terminate the five-year lease before its 
expiry through effluxion of time. Only two arguments were seriously pressed 
before the court. The first was a contractual one. The plaintiffs argued that as 
a matter of construction of the contract of lease, the rent-free period was 
conditional upon the defendant staying as a tenant for the five-year period. 
Choo Han Teck J disagreed with the submission, and held that on a plain 
reading of the contract, the rent-free period was not conditional upon the 
lease expiring only by effluxion of time. The judge pointed out that if the 
plaintiffs’ submission was correct, then it would have made more sense for the 
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defendants to give notice of termination and pay half the sum than to 
negotiate for a surrender only to pay the whole of the sum of six months’ 
rental. Further, the surrender agreement contained no provision as to the 
payment of the rent; although it preserved prior obligations, there was no 
obligation to pay under the lease. 
19.11 In the alternative, counsel for the plaintiffs argued that the plaintiffs 
were entitled to the rent on the basis that the defendants would otherwise 
have been unjustly enriched at the expense of the plaintiffs. This submission 
was also rejected by the court. The parties had regulated their position by 
contract, and if the parties had not made any provision as to the payment of 
the rent during the rent-free period in their surrender agreement, the court 
would not intervene to address the point on their behalf.  
Contractual and non-contractual conditions 
19.12 On the findings of fact, although it was not clear what the basis of the 
restitutionary claim was, it would appear that a claim based on failure of 
consideration could not have succeeded. In a situation where the parties have 
negotiated their respective positions, once it is accepted that there was no 
contractual condition to the conferment of the benefit of the six months’ free 
rental apart from the event of termination by the defendants, it is difficult to 
see how one can resurrect the very same condition as a non-contractual one 
to justify a restitutionary recovery. There are two reasons for this difficulty. 
The first difficulty is an evidential one. It is simply not reasonable to infer a 
factual condition of the conferment (which condition probably also needs to 
be accepted by the recipient of the benefit) which runs contrary to the written 
agreement between the parties in respect of the conferment of that same 
benefit. The second difficulty is related to risk-allocation. In essence, this is 
another example of risk allocation by the parties, this time clearly by contract, 
which the judge found no reason to disturb. The surrender agreement, in the 
view of the judge, had effectively preserved the risk allocation in the lease 
agreement. 
Contribution among tortfeasors 
19.13 The common law did not allow a claim for contribution by one 
tortfeasor against another in respect of the same harm done to the victim, 
even though one tortfeasor could end up being unjustly enriched at the 
expense of the other, in the saving of the expense of discharging an obligation 
to pay damages to the victim, if the victim of the tort chose to proceed only 
against one of them. Although the common law had elsewhere recognised a 
right of contribution where both parties were liable on the same debt and one 
party had discharged it, and equity extended the rules in this respect and also 
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allowed contribution between co-trustees acting in breach of trust, the 
reluctance to extend this reasoning to tortfeasors appears to stem from a 
judicial discomfort with allowing one wrongdoer to proceed against another 
in respect of the wrongdoing. Under English and Singapore law, such 
contribution claims can be made, if at all, only upon statutory authority. The 
position in Singapore today is governed by the Civil Law Act (Cap 43, 
1999 Rev Ed), ss 15 and 16.  
19.14 The predecessor to these current provisions, Civil Law Act (Cap 43, 
1994 Rev Ed) (“the Act”), s 11, was considered in Nganthavee Teriya v Ang Yee 
Lim Lawrence [2003] 2 SLR 361, as the present provisions did not apply 
retrospectively to the facts of the case, the relevant right to contribution 
having allegedly accrued before 1 January 1999.  
19.15 The plaintiff and her husband, as well as the three defendants, were 
all shareholders and directors of two Singapore companies. The plaintiff 
alleged that the defendants had, by a series of wrongs including 
misrepresentation, breach of contract and fiduciary duties and conspiracy, 
caused the shares of herself and her husband in the two companies to be 
diluted, and induced both of them to sell their shares at an undervalue. The 
plaintiff’s husband had also separately commenced proceedings against the 
same defendants on the same bases. In the plaintiff’s action, two of the 
defendants applied to join her husband to the action, in order to claim 
contribution from him as a joint tortfeasor in respect the damages claimed by 
the plaintiff against them.  
19.16 The husband applied to strike out the claim against him in the third 
party application as disclosing no cause of action. The defendants’ application 
was struck out by the Registrar, and the decision was upheld upon appeal to 
the High Court by Judith Prakash J. The judge found many problems with the 
defendants’ statement of claim against the husband and the proposed 
amendments thereto. However, this review will only note the contribution 
claim itself. 
Statutory contribution 
19.17 Prakash J noted that the contribution claim was entirely statutory. 
Though initially understandably perturbed by the claim by one alleged 
wrongdoer to claim contribution from another, the judge was persuaded by 
the arguments in K v P [1993] Ch 140, dealing with the then English provision 
which was in pari materia with the provision under consideration, that 
Parliament had intended to override the common law defence of ex turpi 
causa non oritur actio. Thus, the judge held that she was precluded by the 
language of the legislation from disallowing the third party claim only on the 
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basis that the defendants were asking for relief against damages that they had 
to pay to the plaintiff because they were found liable to her in conspiracy and 
they and her husband were co-conspirators in causing harm to the plaintiff. 
The defendants had a statutory right to contribution against the husband so 
long as they could establish that they were all joint tortfeasors and the damage 
suffered by the plaintiff was the result of that tort, even if the tort was also a 
crime. 
Unjust retention of gains 
19.18 However, under s 11(2) of the Act, the court had to determine the 
quantum of the contribution according to what was just and equitable, having 
regard to the extent of the contributor’s responsibility for the damage, and the 
court had the power to exempt any person from liability to make contribution 
altogether. The judge noted that on the facts, the husband had not received 
any benefit from the alleged conspiracy, but that the benefits of the alleged 
conspiracy had accrued to the defendants. As a result, the effect of allowing 
the two defendants’ contribution claim would be to permit them to retain 
their ill-gotten gains. The judge (at [18]) considered it as a matter of law that: 
[W]here a plaintiff succeeds in recovering from one tortfeasor the 
benefits he has derived from a deliberate tort committed against the 
plaintiff, that tortfeasor would or should not be able to get a contribution 
from a co-tortfeasor such that he is enabled to retain part of his 
wrongfully acquired benefit. 
The court therefore exercised its powers under s 11(2) of the Act to exempt 
the husband from liability to make any contribution at all to the damages for 
which the two defendants might be liable to the plaintiff. 
19.19 The present decision was in respect of provisions that are no longer 
in force. However, the reasoning is likely to be of highly persuasive value in 
the interpretation of the current ss 15 and 16, because although the provisions 
have now cast the net wider to provide for contribution claims in more 
situations, the essence of the former s 11(2) is retained in the current s 16. 
19.20 The denial of the contribution claim could leave a benefit in the 
hands of the plaintiff’s husband, in the sense that he would be saved the 
expense of having to pay on the obligation as a tortfeasor (assuming, of 
course, that the claim is made out). But the court is entitled to and is right to 
consider the effect of contribution on the distribution of the net gains among 
the joint tortfeasors. If A and B jointly and wrongfully (with equal 
blameworthiness) cause damage of $50,000 to C, and C has sued A, then it is 
generally just and equitable that A and B should be treated equally and each 
should shoulder half the burden of the damages ultimately owing to C. The 
effect of contribution leaves them each with the benefit of a saving of $25,000. 
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But if in the same circumstances, the harm done to C results in a gain of 
$50,000 to A and nothing to B, then the same contribution order would leave 
both parties each with the benefit of the saving of $25,000 but A with the 
additional gain of $50,000 from the wrong. On the approach of Prakash J, 
however, B would have no outstanding liability to A, and A would have to 
cough up the $50,000. This is not tantamount to absolving B from blame 
because B could still be sued by C if, for example, A turns out to be insolvent. 
In principle, in order to achieve the same objective, it should follow that if C 
had sued B instead of A, B could ask for contribution of $50,000 from A. 
Further, it is difficult to see what difference it would make in either situation 
if A had spent the $50,000; he had still been enriched, and would generally not 
be in a position to plead any bona fide change of position. This is not the 
division of the spoils of wrongdoing as such, but the exercise of the discretion 
inherent in the statutory contribution rules to give effect to the principle to 
prevent a tortfeasor from benefiting from the wrong. 
